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Foreword
When Mohammed Bouazizi set himself on fire in Tunis 
on December 17, 2010, no one could have imagined that 
this act of protest would eventually lead to the resigna-
tion of Tunisia’s president Zine El Abidine Ben Ali on 
January 14, 2011, after 23 years in power. This, in turn, 
inspired protests and paved the way for uprisings in sev-
eral other Arab countries, with varying results. In Egypt, 
mass protests led to the toppling of long-time president 
Hosni Mubarak and the beginning of a rocky transforma-
tion process; in Libya, Colonel Muammar Gaddafi was 
ousted by a military intervention; in Syria, the ongo-
ing civil war that started in March 2011 has cost tens of 
thousands of civilian lives; in Morocco, King Mohamed 
VI introduced small-scale reforms from above to channel 
public unrest; Bahrain witnessed mass protests, which 
have been suppressed by brute force; and even in the oil-
rich Gulf monarchies, signs of dissatisfaction and protest 
can be observed.
The Arab world has always been a heterogeneous re-
gion with clear differences in social fabrics, development 
statuses, political systems, freedoms, alliances etc. This 
heterogeneity has become even more evident since the 
uprisings took place. In its formal and informal sessions, 
the Alumni conference of the EU-Middle East Forum 
(EUMEF) shed light on different facets and outcomes of 
the Arab uprisings. It explored different domestic scenes, 
highlighting the new and old actors who are directing 
the course within the respective countries, their agendas 
and level of influence pertaining to the democratization 
process and political reforms, and the degree to which 
they respond to the populations’ wishes. The conference 
also addressed how backlashes and developments run-
ning counter to the main demands of the uprisings can be 
counterweighed and reversed. Special attention was giv-
en to the economics of the uprisings. At the heart of the 
protests in the region were demands for social justice, de-
cent education, health, and social security systems, and 
an end to massive poverty, unemployment,  corruption, 
and nepotism – to name the countries’ most alarming 
economic and social woes. Discussions therefore scruti-
nized how these serious deficits were addressed (if they 
were), the type of reforms adopted, and what economic 
options were available to the rulers in the first place 
(against the background of a global neo-liberal order and 
the reality that neediness might hinder an emancipation 
regarding a free economic orientation). Finally – since 
one of the major byproducts of the uprisings is a very 
likely change of regional and international power rela-
tions and dynamics – the conference tackled the geo-
political implications of the uprisings. The impact of this 
reality, combined with the emergence of new respective 
political forces and rulers, on relations vis-à-vis regional 
and international actors such as Turkey, Israel, Iran, the 
US, and the EU were at the center of the debate. 
The reunion gathered 79 promising junior and senior 
experts and activists from the MENA region (Middle East 
and North Africa) and the EU, all alumni of EUMEF’s In-
ternational Summer Schools and New Faces Conferences 
over the past 15 years. With the exception of keynote 
speaker, the conference consisted entirely of alumni 
speakers, discussants, and participants. These had the 
chance to explore cooperation opportunities and present 
their own projects and initiatives. We genuinely believe 
that these intense platforms for dialogue, learning, and 
networking (bringing together different perspectives and 
views from Europe and the MENA region) are essential 
when attempting to make sense of the current histori-
cally unique and very complex developments in the Arab 
region. Only when grasping the different interests and 
needs of the various sides can constructive solutions and 
engagement be developed. EUMEF therefore attaches 
immense value to its network and is very grateful for the 
huge interest in EUMEFs work expressed by the alumni. 
Dina Fakoussa, Head of EUMEF
Christian Achrainer, Program Officer at EUMEF
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Keynote Speech: The Challenge of Pluralism 
in the Middle East
The keynote speech focused on pluralism in the Middle 
East and how it will shape the outcome of the ongoing 
political transformation in the Arab World. The speaker 
started by pointing out that it was not radical Islamic 
forces that were threatening the transitions to democ-
racy, but the lack of a pluralist political system. The fact 
that Egypt and Tunisia are now dominated by one strong 
religious party, and that the so-called liberal or secular 
parties are too small and too weak to challenge the ruling 
party, is the greatest threat for these countries. 
In comparison to Egypt, the situation in Tunisia and 
Morocco is slightly better, because these countries have 
an uninterrupted history of a multi-party system. Some 
of those parties have been operating since the 1950s and 
are deeply rooted in society. Consequently, the political 
system is more balanced and the Moroccan Islamist party 
PJD does not dominate the political scene. In Egypt, how-
ever, the Muslim Brotherhood’s FJP gained the largest 
share of votes by far. 
Thereafter, the speaker laid out three reasons why 
secular parties get few votes, especially in Egypt: First, 
the secular parties have difficulties spreading their mes-
sage. Their programs are too abstract and speak mostly to 
intellectuals (i.e. the Wafd Party) or they are still trying 
to use socialism as a rallying point (i.e. the Nasserist 
parties), while the people no longer believe in this ideol-
ogy. Also, the important issue of social justice has now 
become the terrain of the Islamist parties. Second, the 
secular parties are poorly organized on the ground. The 
third problem is the lack of trustworthy leadership, as 
nearly all of the secular leaders collaborated with the old 
regime at some point, whereas the Islamists were brutally 
prosecuted by the old regimes and therefore have more 
credibility. Additionally, most secular parties have one 
strong leader and coalition-building was hindered by the 
“question of egos.” Here again, Morocco can be regarded 
as an exception, since the secular parties in Morocco have 
a historical legacy and are organized in the same way as 
the Islamists; they have a strong presence throughout the 
nation and not only in the big cities.
Islamist parties are not free from internal divisions or 
even ruptures, however. Ennahda in Tunisia, for ex-
ample, postponed its party meeting several times to avoid 
dealing with problematic issues. It was mostly access to 
power that kept the victorious Islamist parties together. 
Hence, the Islamist parties were far more pluralistic than 
it  appeared. 
During the discussion that followed, many participants 
put forward the issues of rigged elections in Egypt and a 
secret alliance between the Muslim Brotherhood and the 
military. The speaker said that there was no clear evi-
dence supporting such speculations and dismissed them 
as conspiracy theories. Participants also mentioned the 
alleged funding of Islamist parties by some Gulf states, 
whereas others argued that the secular parties could also 
gain financial support, for example from the business 
sector, but this would require better organization and 
more credibility. Besides, the secular parties could copy 
the success of the Muslim Brotherhood and mobilize vo-
lunteers to improve outreach. One participant asked how 
the EU or the US could help to achieve a pluralistic system 
in the region. The speaker stressed that it would not be 
helpful to give financial support to the secular parties 
but rather to help them build organizational structures 
and train young people. Another controversial discussion 
developed around the question of whether members of 
the old regime should be integrated into the political 
arena. While some argued that it would be very dange-
rous to exclude them completely from the political sphere 
and that only the highest ranks should be barred because 
otherwise such prohibitions could be exploited for politi-
cal purposes, others preferred to reject their reemergence. 
Asked about the issue of the Coptic minority in Egypt and 
whether they should form a Christian religious party, the 
speaker said that the Copts would be more successful if 
they joined secular parties. 
Lectures at the DGAP
The following pages summarize each speaker’s contribu-
tion to the Alumni Reunion (in order of appearance). 
Panel I: A Tour d’Horizon through Domestic Politi-
cal Scenes (part one)
1. The Interplay of Regime Survival Strategy and Political 
Reform in Jordan and Morocco after the Arab Spring
Jordan and Morocco are in general no exceptions, as they 
face the same problems as other Arab countries, such as 
social injustice, rising energy prices, etc. However, they 
seem to be immune to the outcomes of the Arab Spring, 
which in other countries has led to a transition process or 
to civil war. Jordan and Morocco share some important 
conditions: both are semi-rentier economies and both are 
monarchies in which the rule of the king is religiously le-
gitimized by a “civic myth.” In addition, in both countries 
Islamists form the main opposition and foreign policies 
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are shaped by geopolitical constrains – the West Sahara 
conflict in the case of Morocco and the Palestinian issue 
and the situation in Syria in the case of Jordan.
The speaker then went on to describe the political situ-
ation in Jordan and the reform projects that have been 
undertaken after the Arab Spring. Jordan was the site 
of mostly non-violent protests which were not spontane-
ous, but organized by the Muslim Brotherhood. The main 
demands of the protests were economic reform, social 
justice, and a more effective fight against corruption. The 
state reacted to these protests mainly with legal reforms 
and new constitutional amendments. A new election law 
was implemented and new elections were held in 2012. 
However, in November 2012 new protests erupted and 
made clear that such cosmetic reforms were not seen as 
sufficient by the people. Therefore, the king would have 
to put much more effort into the reform process, as other-
wise the opposition parties would boycott the next elec-
tions and bring the reform process to an end. At the same 
time, the Jordanian regime is stable and not likely to fall.
As for the Moroccan case, the existence of an estab-
lished multi-party system helped significantly in lending 
credibility to the elections. In addition, the king called for 
a public referendum on a new constitution, which now 
limits the king’s powers. As a result, the prime minister 
is now appointed by the largest party in the parliament, 
currently the moderate Islamist PJD. Morocco’s main 
challenge remains the modernization of the country. 
Solving this problem might also be the central test for the 
new Islamist government. Jordan’s biggest difficulties on 
the other hand are due to its complicated geopolitical sur-
roundings, but also to the fact that the reform process has 
been rather slow. In sum, the political reform process in 
Morocco is much more advanced than in Jordan. 
In the discussion that followed, the presentation’s 
discussant stressed that the comparison between Jordan 
and Morocco is very interesting, especially since the two 
countries are usually disregarded in political analyses of 
the region. Two more commonalities could be added; first, 
both kings see themselves as modern and reform-orient-
ed and second, both countries have a loyal opposition, 
which never challenges the monarchic system as such. 
One participant asked how reliable economic and election 
data were and the speaker replied that caution was neces-
sary regarding all data from these countries and that 
elections were generally manipulated, although no longer 
at the ballot box, but instead through gerrymandering. 
Other comments revolved around the idea of “authoritar-
ian upgrading” and on the question of whether regimes 
can survive if the king exclusively manages the transition. 
2. The Other Side of a Neo-Liberal Miracle: Economic Re-
form and Political De-Liberalization in Ben Ali’s Tunisia
The presentation focused on the seemingly contradictory 
fact that economic liberalization in Ben Ali’s Tunisia allo-
wed for a deeper penetration of state power into society 
and for new modes of control in a climate of economic 
uncertainty. The classic modernization theory sees a cor-
relation between capitalism and democracy but is widely 
regarded as flawed nowadays. Nevertheless, elements 
still resurfaced sometimes. No economic statistics were 
used in the analysis because numbers are always associa-
ted with power and are usually manipulated in authorita-
rian regimes. 
Tunisia was seen as a perfect illustration of the failure 
of modernization theory. The country experienced an 
“economic miracle,” as it was called by the Tunisian state. 
However, this did not only lead to democratization, but 
it did lead to further de-liberalization. The case studies 
depicted in the presentation were two Tunisian financial 
institutions, the Banque Tunisienne de Solidarité (BTS) 
and the Fonds de Solidartité Nationale (FSN). Both insti-
tutions are presented by the state as institutions for the 
redistribution of wealth, funded by wealthier segments of 
society to help those disadvantaged by economic liber-
alization. However, the BTS and the FSN did not create 
wealth or fight unemployment, but instead mainly added 
to an already large state bureaucracy. These institutions 
in fact served another purpose in which they were quite 
successful: to create modes of dependency and supervi-
sion, which should eventually prolong the regime’s grip 
on power. To this end, the jobs created by the two institu-
tions were precarious and were paid much less than nor-
mal jobs. Therefore, people remained dependent on state 
institutions. For some jobs, young graduates were even 
required to join or work with the ruling party. Addition-
ally, payments to BTS and FSN were closely monitored 
and provided a further tool of state control.
The regime’s emphasis, also spread via the media, on 
the need to preserve the Tunisian “economic miracle” 
acted as a further control tool. The regime pushed the 
message that the economy was dependent on foreign in-
vestment and tourism, therefore nobody should protest in 
order not to endanger the “economic miracle.” In alliance 
with the Tunisian business sector, the regime also pro-
moted a certain work ethos and the concept of primisme, 
the nationalist idea that Tunisia has always been more 
advanced than other Arab countries. 
Through such means, the regime’s institutions were 
able to control the unemployed and the employed, the 
poor and richer segments alike. Even outsiders, such as 
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European states and analysts or the World Bank, repro-
duced the economic statistics supplied by the Tunisian 
regime, although they had previously been proven wrong. 
Internationally, Tunisia was portrayed as positive and 
developing, a notion that further invalidated internal dis-
sent. The regime also strengthened its ties with the West 
by promoting a strong secularism and connecting the 
road to democracy to anti-Islamism. 
In the discussion that followed, many participants com-
pared the situation in Tunisia with that in Egypt, which 
was also dominated by a franchise economy and focused 
on consumption and real estate rather than production. 
In addition, many were reminded by the Tunisian work 
ethos of similar calls to “go back to work” in Egypt after 
the revolution. Another part of the discussion revolved 
around the question of public myths and whether people 
really believed them. In the speaker’s opinion, a regime 
could not survive by mere repression and that there had 
to be something else to keep the state together. The last 
question dealt with the situation of the BTS and FSN after 
the revolution: They had survived the turmoil, but were 
also criticized for their notorious corruption. 
3. The Role of the Media in Creating Revolutions: The 
Case of Egypt
The presentation focused on the role of domestic, regi-
onal, and international television during the Egyptian 
uprising that began on January 25, 2011. In regards to 
domestic television, differences between private and 
state-owned broadcasters were also taken into account.
The state-owned TV broadcasters from the very begin-
ning ignored the protests or downplayed their size. To 
illustrate this point, the speaker showed recordings of the 
state media’s covering of the protests and how they only 
showed small numbers of protesters in side streets of Tah-
rir Square or ignored the protests and aired pictures of 
celebrations of national police day on January 25. In the 
later days of the revolution, state-owned TV was the main 
tool by which the regime communicated with its citizens 
and, for example, informed the public about curfews and 
other measures. 
In regards to the private satellite channels, it cannot be 
said that the regime controlled these stations. Neverthe-
less, the private broadcasters followed the state-owned 
TV broadcasters during the first days of the revolution 
and also ignored or downplayed the protests. However, 
there was a particular moment during the protests when 
the style of private coverage changed. This was the “Bat-
tle of Camels” on January 28, when regime-hired thugs on 
camels and horses tried to brutally crush the protestors 
on Tahrir Square. After this event, the private TV broad-
casters changed to a pro-revolutionary position. This shift 
in positions can be explained as the private broadcasters’ 
wish to follow the public mood which changed very much 
after the “Battle of Camels”.
The speaker concluded that the change in the private 
broadcasters’ position had been very important for the 
revolution as it served as a catalyst for the next days, and 
their positive coverage brought significantly more people 
to the streets.
The discussant saluted the examination of the role of 
“traditional” media in a time when most research is done 
on the so-called new media and on social networks. How-
ever, the main critique was that the analysis should have 
elaborated further on the internal mechanisms of the 
private broadcasters to better explain their shift. Besides, 
it was considered helpful to include the role of the new 
media in an analysis of traditional media. Other partici-
pants also said that the presentation could have put more 
stress on the importance of international media such as 
al-Jazeera, France24, or BBC Arabic. The speaker replied 
that France24 and BCC were not very prominent in Egypt 
and that due to the rivalry between Egypt and Qatar, al-
Jazeera was not seen as a very objective source of news by 
many Egyptians. 
Panel II: A Tour d’Horizon through Domestic  
Political Scenes (part two)
1. Current Issues Facing Lebanon and its Relation to the 
Syrian Crisis
The presentation provided an overview of the current po-
litical situation in Lebanon, delineating the most severe 
challenges facing the country. Especially in light of the 
recent assassination of Wissem el-Hassan, head of the 
intelligence division of the Internal Security Forces, many 
analysts predict a new wave of violence spreading out 
across the country.
Political stagnation as well as corruption within all lev-
els of government are serious internal issues. The Leba-
nese political system can be described as “consociational” 
and confessional; power is divided among the country’s 
communities according to their demographic weight, half 
of the seats in parliament are ascribed to Muslims and 
half to Christians. Furthermore, the country is divided 
into two coalitions consisting of different political parties 
and communities: the March 8 coalition, which nomi-
nated the current head of government, Najib Mikati, and 
which is affiliated with Hezbollah, and the March 14 coali-
tion, which acted against the Syrian occupation and gath-
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ers the majority of Sunni Muslims, the fact that there has 
been no renewal of the political class has led to political 
stagnation and consequently, desperately needed politi-
cal and economic reforms have not been implemented. In 
addition, the country is politically divided with regards 
to the crisis in Syria. While the March 8 coalition sup-
ports Syria logistically and Hezbollah has sent troops, the 
March 14 coalition supports regime change.
The deteriorating economic situation was mentioned 
as a second challenge. Growing insecurity and incidents 
of kidnapping of tourists from the Gulf region, in addi-
tion to the Syrian crisis, have harmed tourism, which is 
one of the country’s main economic sectors. Corruption, 
massive unemployment, and inflation create further ten-
sions. Even more severe, however, is the situation of the 
Palestinian refugees who have no citizenship and hence 
enjoy neither economic nor political rights. As the role of 
the Palestinians during the Lebanese civil war is still very 
present within society, the issue of their critical living 
conditions is hardly tackled. Ignoring this problem is very 
dangerous, as the situation could explode at any time. 
Not only the domestic background, also the regional 
context as well as the behavior of the international com-
munity have to be taken into account when analyzing 
the situation in Lebanon, so the argument went. Foreign 
influence on internal issues in Lebanon has always been 
dominant. This can be exemplified by Wissem el-Hassan’s 
assassination, after which Western governments ignored 
opposition claims to a new government and backed the 
current administration, because they considered stability 
in Lebanon more important in light of the Syrian crisis. 
According to the presentation’s discussant, the division 
between the two coalitions must also be linked to the po-
litical division in the region. While the March 14 coalition 
is supported by the US and Saudi Arabia, Syria and Iran 
side with the March 8 coalition. Lebanon can be consid-
ered as a playground for East and West: whereas the West 
sees the country as a continuation of Syria, predicting 
that Hezbollah will fall after the fall of Assad, Iran consid-
ers Lebanon as an alternative to Syria as regards support 
for Hezbollah and against Israel. Not only political actors 
were heavily influenced by foreign agendas, but also civil 
society in Lebanon. However, new groups are emerging 
that are frustrated with the current situation and both 
coalitions because they are allegedly pursuing an interna-
tional, instead of a national, agenda.
Despite the deteriorating situation, the speaker sees 
little chance that recent events will lead to a civil war in 
Lebanon. Since Hezbollah is the only armed group in the 
country apart from the state, no oppositional group or ac-
tor equipped to start an armed conflict can be identified. 
During the discussion, this view was heavily contested 
by the argument that every group in Lebanon has arms 
and even if the tensions do not lead to a civil war, civil 
violence is very likely to break out. In addition to serious 
internal problems, the international environment contrib-
uted greatly to instability in Lebanon. Above all, the state 
has to regain its authority in order to be able to control all 
actors in the country, especially Hezbollah, and to initiate 
reforms. 
2. Suppressing the Uprising in Syria: Bashar al-Assad’s 
Counterinsurgency Strategies
Since the beginning of the uprisings in Syria, political 
analysts and journalists have been predicting that Bashar 
al-Assad’s fall is only a matter of time, given his decrea-
sing support within the Syrian population. Pointing out 
that, so far, Western predictions have not come to pass, 
the presentation deconstructed common assumptions in 
support of the conclusion that Assad’s regime will sooner 
or later be toppled. 
The first argument that was challenged in the presen-
tation is: If a regime loses the support of the population, 
it will lose the war. According to the speaker, it is not 
popular support that leads to a shift within the balance 
of power, but active support. Only when the opposition 
receives active support in terms of logistics, information, 
money or recruits, can it inflict damage on the regime’s 
infrastructure and consequently win the war. Popular 
support, on the other hand, is not the decisive factor that 
leads to victory. Assad’s regime knows very well that it 
cannot win the hearts of the population. Nevertheless, its 
counterinsurgency strategies prove to be successful. 
In addition, analysts using this line of argument as-
sume that there is only the possibility of siding with the 
regime or acting against it. Neutrality, or behavior which 
supports none of the opposing parties, is usually not con-
sidered. These analysts ignore the crucial fact that active 
support is in most cases provided by minorities, while the 
large silent majority becomes visible only at the end of 
the war or conflict, siding with the victorious party. The 
fact that this silent majority grows in number suffices any 
regime in order to survive. In the case of Syria, Assad’s 
brutality is the reason why he is losing popular support, 
but it is also the reason why he is still in power. The situa-
tion in Iraq in 1991 can be used as a reference to illustrate 
this point, as Saddam Hussein, a minority leader like 
Bashar al-Assad, was in a far more fragile situation. After 
Saddam’s army was decimated by coalition forces during 
the Second Gulf War, public dissent against the Baath 
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regime grew and Saddam’s forces lost control over 14 of 
the country’s 18 provinces. Yet, by using extreme vio-
lence, Saddam managed to survive and won the conflict. 
Likewise, Assad’s brutality may ensure the survival of the 
regime.
The fragmented condition of the opposition is further 
complicating the situation. Although Syrian opposition 
factions agreed to unite in a National Coalition for Syrian 
Revolutionary and Opposition Forces at the beginning 
of November, unity is far from achieved. Consequently, 
Syrian insurgents are disorganized and poorly equipped 
and the use of improvised explosive devices (IED’s) such 
as roadside bombs will not suffice to defeat the regime. 
Moreover, the opposition could start venting its frustra-
tion with the persistency of the regime on the Syrian 
population. 
Concerning the use of the term “opposition”, the 
presentation’s discussant stressed that journalists usu-
ally did not make clear whether they referred to armed 
rebels, political movements, or civil opposition. The term 
is used rather to describe any action or attitude against 
the government. Furthermore, the discussion focused on 
whether the international community will acknowledge 
the newly formed coalition. So far, the fragmentation 
of the opposition has been the main reason the interna-
tional community has not provided arms and military 
equipment. In the light of the unification, excuses for not 
supporting the opposition in Syria are running out. Yet 
reactions from the US and France have been reserved and 
reluctant. 
The speaker concluded that analysts were much too 
optimistic when writing about Syria’s future because 
their argumentation was logically inconsistent. Instead, 
he urged them to be more moderate regarding their as-
sumptions and predictions and to abstain from confusing 
analyses with political positions or wishful thinking. 
3. A Middle Eastern Model of Democracy? Comparing 
Tunisian, Egyptian, and Israeli Discourses of Citizenship
Despite differences between the countries analyzed, a 
regional pattern in Middle Eastern understandings of 
“democracy” and “citizenship” that deviates from Western 
understandings can be depicted. Taking the catchphra-
ses after the uprisings in Egypt and Tunisia as a starting 
point, the speaker pointed out that in both countries, the 
discourse about democracy and 
citizenship revolved around the issue of identity. 
Muhammad Morsi as well as Rashid Ghannouchi have 
claimed to be fully representative of their peoples in 
domestic and foreign policy as they, unlike the former 
regimes, fully incorporate their respective country’s Is-
lamic identity. Thus they are building on a broad national 
consensus about the Islamic identity of their respective 
countries and adopting religious language as a means to 
mirror this consensus.
While the concept of individual citizenship is the basis 
of the Western democratic model, it is much less wide-
spread in the Middle East. In the case of Egypt, Morsi 
never speaks of individuals but addresses the nation as a 
whole or as “sisters and brothers” or “sons and daughters.” 
Therefore, he prizes collective community and national 
belonging above the individual citizen and his rights. He 
fosters a narrative of national cohesion by assuming that 
the nation has one shared goal, avoiding sectarianism. 
This indicates that democracy in Egypt is still at stake. 
Although civil society in Egypt is often regarded as a 
positive modern concept that was jeopardized by former 
regimes, but became independent from the state after the 
revolution, there is no link to the promotion of individual 
rights, because efforts usually address groups as a whole.
Israel, which perceives itself as a Western-style democ-
racy in which individual rights are fully endorsed, has 
not witnessed a revolution similar to the one in Egypt. 
However, developments over the past forty years can be 
described as a demographic revolution, which is also re-
flected in the parliamentary and democratic system. Tak-
ing a closer look, discourse about citizenship or connected 
issues follows similar patterns as described for Egypt. 
Like the Egyptian leadership, Israeli leadership tries to 
represent the majority of the country. The majority nar-
rative in Israel can be described as an ethno-nationalist 
discourse, as it refers to ethno-national groups, but also 
to religion.
During the discussion, the speaker pointed out that 
the main risk of this understanding of citizenship was the 
fact that the majority sets structures in which minority 
rights are endorsed as such, but individuals who are not 
accepted as minorities do not enjoy any rights or security. 
This is especially critical for persons who do not belong 
to one of the three acknowledged monotheistic religions 
(Judaism, Christianity, and Islam). In Egypt, for example, 
groups such as the Bahá’i are not recognized as minori-
ties and hence lack full citizenship rights. It is therefore 
difficult for them to take equal part in society or to 
practice their religion, and they lack equal access to state 
institutions. This problem became very visible during 
the constitution-writing process, which was by no means 
inclusive, since groups that were not accepted were not 
involved in the process and persons who do not belong to 
the three acknowledged monotheistic religions will again 
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neither be recognized nor treated equally. In Tunisia, on 
the other hand, where the opposition parties are much 
stronger, a much more inclusive and all-encompasing 
discourse on individual rights is taking place within both 
different religious communities as well as secular groups.
Panel III: Geo-Political and Security Implications of 
the Arab Uprisings
1. Unintended Consequences? Coping with the Conse-
quences of the Arab Spring in the Sahel
The presentation focused on the “unintended conse-
quences” of the Arab Spring for the Sahel, especially the 
violent uprising against the Qaddafi regime in Libya. The 
Sahel is a historical frontier region. It has always been a 
buffer zone, dividing the Arab Maghreb from sub-Saha-
ran Africa. The borders which nowadays exist between 
countries were once drawn by colonialists and have never 
really been accepted by the inhabitants of the region. 
Additionally, the region had largely been absent from the 
agendas of international policy after the Cold War, and 
even during the Cold War interest had never been high. 
However, after 9/11 and the appearance of the terrorist 
group Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), interest 
reappeared although the terrorist groups in the Sahel 
are more Mafia-like organized crime organizations than 
jihadists. 
The uprising and the ensuing civil war in Libya 
changed the situation dramatically. Well-armed Touareg 
groups, who had previously fought for Qaddafi, returned 
to northern Mali and quickly defeated the official army. 
The events also triggered a military coup in southern Mali 
and Malian democracy fell in only two months. Mali was 
previously regarded as a model state and the only democ-
racy in the entire region. These events and the fact that 
the Touareg rebels worked closely together with militant 
jihadists quickly brought the Sahel onto international 
agendas. Many feared that northern Mali could become 
like Afghanistan in the 1990s and turn into a safe haven 
for terrorists. 
The irony is the fact that the success of the movement 
for freedom and democracy in Libya had led to the fall of 
the only existing democracy in the Sahel. This develop-
ment entails many risks and during the Libyan uprising, 
no one in the West had thought about the consequences 
the fall of the Libyan regime might have for the countries 
in the Sahel, which were closely connected and whose 
economies were largely dependent on remittances and 
funding from Libya. 
The discussion that followed focused mainly on the 
possibility of a military intervention in northern Mali 
and on how neighboring states would react to such plans. 
The speaker emphasized that the ECOWAS intervention 
was in the main accepted by Mali’s neighbors, but that its 
efficiency was questionable and that it might also be too 
late. Other questions were related to the role of Algeria, 
a country which has been largely against any Western 
intervention. Algeria did not want to be involved in any 
international intervention and therefore was not very 
supportive of an intervention in Mali either. The speaker 
concluded that any military intervention in the region 
would be very difficult due to the large area of operation, 
the high number of internally displaced persons, and the 
fact that AQIM has been operating in the region since 25 
years. 
2. Egypt-Israel-Palestine: The Bermuda Triangle? 
The presentation focused on the situation in the Sinai 
Peninsula, and on how developments there influenced 
relations between Egypt, Israel, and Palestine. Israel has 
had a rather safe southern border over the past years, 
enabling it to deploy most of its troops to the northern 
frontier and around Gaza. However, after the regime 
change in Egypt, Israel faced new threats on its long bor-
der with Egypt. This had nothing to do with the actions 
of the Egyptian state, as both Israel and Egypt wanted to 
keep the “cold peace,” which is also kept in place by the 
strong US influence on both countries. It is rather the th-
reat from small terrorists groups operating in the security 
vacuum in Sinai which is worrying Israel the most. Local 
Bedouin groups in Sinai, who have been politically and 
economically neglected over centuries, took advantage of 
the security vacuum after the Egyptian Revolution. The 
Bedouins also allowed some jihadist groups to operate 
in the area and these groups undertook several attacks 
on Israel. Israeli security forces quickly reacted to the 
new threat and started to fortify the border with a fence, 
which will be finished by the end of 2012. Additionally, 
more troops and the Iron Dome missile defense system 
were deployed, and Israel was quite successful in building 
a human intelligence network in the border area. 
From the Egyptian perspective, it is of crucial impor-
tance to regain the monopoly of force in the Sinai, as 
violence also poses a great security threat to Egypt and 
the tourism sector. 
The relationship of the new Egyptian government and 
Hamas, a movement which originated from the Muslim 
Brotherhood, is complicated. Unlike what one might 
expect, Egyptian leadership had not given Hamas a blank 
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check, since they also wanted to build up international 
credibility and reestablish Egypt as a regional power. 
For the same reason, the border crossing at Rafah is 
still closed for trade, a fact that helps Israel maintain its 
blockade of Gaza. Due to its position in the Syrian crisis, 
Hamas also lost Iran and Syria as allies and suppliers 
of weapons and therefore needs to look for new funds. 
This is one of the reasons why Hamas split its leadership 
between Egypt and Qatar. 
In the subsequent discussion, the presentation was crit-
icized by some participants for mainly focusing on Israeli 
interests and for not looking at the issue from a human 
security perspective in Gaza or Egypt. One participant 
stressed that most of the attacks by jihadists in the Sinai 
were directed against Egyptian security forces and citi-
zens and not against Israel. The speaker explained these 
attacks on Egyptian security forces as attempts of the ji-
hadists and Bedouins to create an operational space in the 
Sinai which would allow for more coordinated attacks in 
the future. The emerging role of Qatar in the region was 
also part of the debate. It was put forth that Qatar plays 
both sides, as it replaced Syria and Iran in funding Hamas, 
but also has one of the largest US bases on its soil.
3. The Kurdish Question and the Arab Uprisings
Even though Kurds and Palestinians both have their own 
distinctive history, many similarities exist. Large seg-
ments of both populations live in the diaspora, spread 
out among different countries. Furthermore, both groups 
formed armed militias that have partly transformed into 
political actors, but have also resumed armed activities 
and have split into different factions that sometimes seem 
more concerned with fighting each other than fighting for 
some broader goal. 
The Syrian revolution had dramatically changed the 
established power dynamics in the Kurdish regions, as 
the Kurdish movement in Syria, the PYD, had been able to 
secure a quasi-autonomous area. The PYD is aligned with 
the Kurdish movement in Turkey, the PKK, and therefore 
is an opponent to the Iraqi fraction, the Kurdish National 
Congress (KNC).
In regards to the situation of the Kurdish groups in 
the different countries, the speaker urged to understand 
that Turkey is first and foremost concerned about Kurd-
ish military activity in northern Syria, as the area has 
already been used as a staging ground for attacks on 
Turkey. However, the reconciliation process in Turkey has 
been frozen for years now, and the legitimate demands 
of Kurdish political forces are not being answered, which 
might again strengthen the violent PKK. A military solu-
tion to the Kurdish question is impossible and would only 
support the radicals, a fact in which the speaker again 
saw a similarity to the Palestinians. 
Iran is also trying to use its influence on Kurdish 
politics to make sure that Iraqi Kurds will not support 
Syrian Kurds in a potential fight against Assad. In Iraq, 
the party of President Talabani, the PUK, and the KNC 
are increasingly becoming rivals. But as the KNC is still 
dependent on the Iraqi central government, it is unlikely 
that they can openly support Syrian Kurds against Assad. 
However, the situation in northern Syria is getting worse 
as the PYD is increasingly fighting against the Free Syrian 
Army (FSA) and other Arab rebel groups. Until now, both 
sides have been trying to downplay the confrontation, but 
things might change over the next months.
In the discussion that followed, it was mentioned that 
dealing with the Syrian Kurds would also affect the Turk-
ish Kurds and that the Arab Spring had already brought 
changes to Kurdish political agitation, such as the recent 
hunger strikes. The speaker again stressed that Turkey 
wants to keep Syria as a state, because if Syria splits 
up, the Kurds would have their own state in the region, 
which Turkey regards as being unacceptable. At this point, 
someone also asked whether Kurds would leave Turkey 
in this case to live in a new Kurdish state. In the speaker’s 
opinion, this would probably not be the majority and 
any future Kurdish state would be at least economically 
dependent on Turkey. 
Panel IV: External Actors and the Arab Uprisings
1. Overcoming Mutual Mistrust: A Consideration of 
America’s Strategic Intentions in the Middle East
The presentation provided an overview of US strategy in 
the Middle East since World War II, focusing on Egypt, 
Saudi Arabia, and Israel. These three countries were not 
only selected because they are the closest allies of the US 
in the region, but also because they are the countries that 
have received the largest US investments. However, there 
have been differences regarding their ability to exert 
influence on the US. America’s key strategic goals in the 
region are the interest in oil, security and stability, coun-
ter terrorism and, in light of the revolutions, the promo-
tion of democracy and American values. Mutual mistrust 
between the US and its allies as regards the development 
of US involvement is growing, which is likely to have a 
serious impact on US strategy in the future.
Since 1970, Egypt has been America’s closest ally, re-
ceiving almost $70 billion, mostly in the form of military 
aid. The US has focused on fostering peace between 
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Egypt and Israel and, after 9/11, on counterterrorism. 
Especially in the context of the latter, the US has been 
seriously concerned about Islamist activism in Egypt 
and connections with al-Qaeda. Despite these concerns, 
American support continued after the Muslim Brother-
hood won the parliamentary as well as presidential 
elections. This is putting US President Barak Obama in 
a difficult situation as he is supporting a democratically 
elected government on the one hand, but has to bear in 
mind America’s interest – namely Egypt adhering to the 
peace treaty with Israel and to counterterrorism efforts – 
on the other hand.
In the case of Saudi Arabia, US interests have been 
concentrated on oil. Since 9/11, however, distrust to-
ward its ally has been rising on the American side, after 
Saudi involvement in terrorism was discovered. From 
Saudi Arabia’s point of view, the relationship was further 
strained by America’s intervention in Iraq, which has led 
to a shifting Sunni-Shia power balance in the region. In 
addition, the fact that Saudi Arabia could not manage to 
keep the oil price low – a key interest of the USA – could 
be a game changer within the relationship, as America 
has been starting to intensify relations with other oil ex-
porting countries that have a growing impact on oil prices. 
Furthermore, the US is wary of Saudi Arabia’s global mis-
sionary activities, whereas Saudi Arabia was shocked to 
see how quickly Egypt’s Hosni Mubarak lost the support 
of its long-standing ally. 
Regarding the American-Israeli relationship, there 
were deviating opinions about how to deal with the 
consequences of the Arab uprisings. Israel is mainly wor-
ried about the rise of Arab Islamism and Iran’s nuclear 
program and is unsatisfied with America’s policies in the 
region. In addition, the personal relationship between 
Obama and Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu has not 
been very good, illustrated, for example, by Netanyahu’s 
support for Mitt Romney during the presidential elec-
tion campaign. The influence of the USA in the region 
was found to be diminishing due to the growing mistrust 
between America and its allies and America’s inability to 
find suitable means to counter these developments. Fur-
thermore, the speaker regarded America’s current efforts 
as an anti-ideological pragmatism, because US practices 
are more pragmatic than strategic and do not follow a 
certain ideological or strategic framework. 
During the discussion it was mentioned that it was 
indeed difficult to set up a clear strategy for a situation 
as complex and uncertain as the current situation in the 
Middle East. The speaker projected that the US would 
either revive its engagement in the region, for example 
get actively involved in the Syrian crisis, or retreat and 
reorient toward other regions. 
2. The European Parliament and EU Foreign Policy in the 
MENA Region
The presentation focused on defining the role of the 
European Parliament in establishing a European foreign 
policy in the MENA region. Providing a general descrip-
tion of the different organs of the European Union and 
their respective competences, the speaker compared the 
EU to a traditional “family”. Within this metaphor, the 
European Commission (EC) plays the role of mother, as it 
is taking care of home issues, such as the internal market. 
The father on the other hand, in this case the member 
states and the European Council (EC), is responsible for 
those issues that are considered to be more important, for 
example issues closely related to the sovereignty of the 
member states such as health, education or foreign policy. 
The European Parliament (EP) in this picture resembles 
the son who has a voice, but not a vote. 
In general, the EU has only a limited scope of power 
in terms of foreign policy, as member states decide these 
issues on their own. With the ratification of the Lisbon 
Treaty, however, the EU introduced a new foreign rela-
tions framework, which included the creation of the 
European External Action Service (EEAS), headed by the 
High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and 
Security Policy (HR). Yet these changes did not widen 
the European Parliament’s scope of influence on foreign 
policy issues, which continued to be outside the decision-
making process.
The fact that the European Parliament does not have 
a decisive influence on foreign policy, however, does not 
mean that it cannot play a role. This can be exemplified 
by referring to the MENA region, where the EP’s role can 
be fostered in the future. According to the High Represen-
tative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy 
(HR), Catherine Ashton, the MENA region is a top priority, 
not only due to the fact that it is a neighboring region, 
but especially due to recent events and the concomitant 
challenges, as well as member states’ involvement in the 
region. There are eight EP delegations (out of a total of 
41) that focus on the MENA region, partly by building on 
past initiatives, such as the Union for the Mediterranean, 
and partly by creating new ones, for example in coopera-
tion with the Gulf Cooperation Council. So far, the EP has 
been balancing a mix of democracy-based and economy-
based approaches. Illustrating the EP’s successful engage-
ment in the region, the speaker referred to the examples 
of Libya and Israel-Palestine.
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In 2011, months before the toppling of Gaddafi, the EP 
addressed the European Council with recommendations 
regarding the EU-Libya Framework Agreement, stipula-
ting, among other things, the inclusion of human rights 
issues and migrant rights in the agreement, as well as the 
opening of an EU delegation in Libya. When the uprisings 
started, the EP approved a resolution condemning human 
rights violations in the country and calling for an end to 
brutality and for Gaddafi’s resignation. Additionally, the 
EP called on the HR to establish relations with the Libyan 
interim Transitional National Council and to support 
elections. The Libyan case shows that the new diplomatic 
framework, although it did not touch the EP directly, wi-
dened its scope of influence by providing the EP with the 
HR – a new ally who could spread the EP’s views.
Regarding the EP’s engagement in Israel-Palestine, the 
EU and Israel Agreement on Conformity Assessment and 
Acceptance of Industrial Products (ACAA), approved by 
the EP in October 2012 after two years of debating, was 
mentioned. Despite the main concern that pharmaceutical 
products from the occupied territories could enter the EU 
zone, the EP proved its strength by debating and finally 
deciding the issue.
The speaker concluded the lecture by proposing policy 
recommendations that aim to widen the scope of the EP’s 
influence on foreign policy issues. Among others, a more 
specific framework targeting the MENA region should be 
developed. The EP should also act as a valuable partner 
of the EEAS, for example as a platform for greater access 
to civil society in the region, which is to a growing extent 
influenced by Islamist actors. Here again, the importance 
of lobbying the HR in order to compensate the EP’s lack of 
legislative power in foreign policy issues must be stressed. 
Furthermore, the EP could implement the EC’s tool of 
“naming and shaming” member states that do not act in 
line with the EP’s recommendations. The Multiannual 
Financial Framework provides another new possibility 
through which the EP can use its power in order to cre-
ate a more coherent and comprehensive approach to the 
MENA region. 
The discussion highlighted in particular the limits 
of the conditionality linked to EU support in the MENA 
region. While the EU can use the prospect of membership 
in order to influence policies in Eastern Europe, potential 
membership and the concomitant benefits can obviously 
not be implemented in a Middle Eastern context. Thus, it 
was stipulated that the EU must find new mechanisms in 
order to make the less for less and more for more  approach 
more effective.  
3. Turkey and the Arab Uprisings
Over the past years, Turkey has undergone a tremendous 
transformation regarding its foreign policy and the status 
it enjoys within the international community. The presen-
tation delineated how shifts in Turkey’s foreign policy can 
be regarded as a precursor of the role it has played since 
the Arab Uprising.
The speaker started by providing a general background 
of the history and development of Turkish foreign policy. 
When Atatürk founded Turkey as a modern, secular 
Western republic in 1923, he made a clear break with the 
Muslim caliphate and, with it, the Muslim past and the 
heritage of the Ottoman Empire. Thus, Turkey detached 
itself from its “natural habitat” in the Middle East, reori-
enting itself toward the West. During the Cold War, Tur-
key was an ally of the US and its foreign policy depended 
on the interests of the West. However, the presentation’s 
discussant pointed out that Turkey was never completely 
cut off from the Arab countries, but has always had rela-
tions to its neighbors. Instead, it should be regarded as a 
step-by-step shift toward the West.
Turkey’s foreign policy strategies, however, changed 
with the AKP electoral victory in 2002. As a reformist pro-
Western party that stands for a moderate interpretation 
of Islam, it continued to focus on the West, but included 
the element of natural habitat into its foreign policy 
strategies and turned toward its Muslim neighbors. The 
theoretical foundation was provided by the Turkish For-
eign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu, who had authored and 
designed the change in his 2001 book Strategic Depth (in 
Turkish). Therein, he described the potential of Turkey’s 
geopolitical and geostrategic position and how to realize 
it by opening to the East without breaking with the West. 
Although this did not imply imperial policies, it was often 
criticized as a new Ottoman policy. 
Instead, Turkey wanted to revive the relations it once 
had with its neighbors but had neglected during the Cold 
War, and introduced a “zero problem policy” into its for-
eign relations. This included approaching Syria and Iran, 
which was highly problematic for the Turkish government, 
as it meant going against the interests of its Western allies. 
Nevertheless, without this partial turn toward the East, 
Turkey could not have played a credible role during and 
after the Arab Spring.
There are additional factors that turned Turkey into 
the main supporter of the uprisings. A thought articu-
lated was that as a country with Muslim heritage and a 
secular system, Turkey was welcomed as a role model for 
the states undergoing political change. The AKP itself, 
having embraced Islam as part of their political think-
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ing and interests, provided a role model for the newly 
formed (moderate) Islamist parties in Egypt, Tunisia, 
and Morocco. Turkey not only organized conferences for 
moderate Islamist political movements, Prime Minister 
Recep Tayyip Erdogan also traveled to Tunisia and Egypt 
in order to offer the newly elected governments his advice 
and support. Concerning Syria, Turkey had in the past 
been most active in initiatives to build friendly economic 
relations and encouraged the Syrian government to intro-
duce political reforms. After the conflict broke out, Turkey 
reacted quickly by assuring support for the opposition, 
hosting the Syrian National Council in Istanbul and tak-
ing in Syrian refugees. Furthermore, it mediated between 
different factions within the opposition, and played a 
significant role in bringing them together in the National 
Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces 
at the beginning of November 2012. However, the war has 
spilled over to Turkey and criticism has arisen concerning 
Turkey’s overly ambitious role in the Arab uprisings.
As to Turkey’s relations to the US, they were found to 
have suffered from a deep crisis before and after Amer-
ica’s invasion of Iraq in 2003, but have been successfully 
mended. Meanwhile, Turkey is recognized as the most 
important US ally in the region and cooperation regard-
ing Syria has been very close. Turkey’s relations with the 
EU, on the other hand, are not as close due mainly to the 
freeze of Turkish accession talks. The speaker concluded 
that the transformation of Turkey’s foreign policy must be 
seen as the reason for the republic’s growing influence in 
the Middle Eastern region today.
Note
  The conference was held under the Chatham House Rule.
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